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Abstract
Recently, Zou et al. [Phys. Rev. A 82, 042325 (2010)] demonstrated
that two arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes are not secure,
because an arbitrator cannot arbitrate the dispute between two users when
a receiver repudiates the integrity of a signature. By using a public board,
Zou et al. proposed two AQS schemes to solve the problem. This work
shows that the same security problem may exist in Zou et al.’s schemes.
Moreover, a malicious verifier, Bob, can actively negate a signed order if
he wants to. This attack, a special case of denial-of-service (DoS) attack
mentioned in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 109801 (2003)], is important in
quantum cryptography. Bob may get some benefits with this DoS attack,
since he can actively deny Alice’s signed order without being detected.
This work also shows that a malicious signer can reveal the verifier’s secret
key without being detected by using Trojan-horse attacks.
Keywords: Quantum information; Quantum cryptography; Arbi-
trated quantum signature.
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1 Introduction
The quantum signature, which provides the authenticity and non-repudiation
of quantum states on an insecure quantum channel [1, 2], is one of the most
important topics of research in quantum cryptography. The quantum signature
can provide unconditional security by exploiting the principles of quantum me-
chanics, such as the no-cloning theory and measurement uncertainty. Two basic
properties are required in a quantum signature [1] :
1. Unforgeability: Neither the signature verifier nor an attacker can forge a
signature or change the content of a signature. The signature should not
be reproducible by any other person.
2. Undeniability: A signatory, Alice, who has sent the signature to the ver-
ifier, Bob, cannot later deny having provided a signature. Moreover, the
verifier Bob cannot deny the receipt of a signature.
The first quantum signature was proposed by Gottesman and Chuang [3]. Sub-
sequently, a variety of quantum signature schemes have been proposed [1, 2, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Zeng et al. [1] proposed an arbitrated quantum sig-
nature (AQS) scheme based on the correlation between Green-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) states and quantum one-time pads. However, Curty et al. [6] pointed
out that this AQS scheme [1] is not clearly described and that the security
statements claimed by the authors are incorrect. In response [7], Zeng provided
a more detailed presentation and proof to Zeng et al.’s original AQS scheme
[1]. To improve the transmission efficiency and to reduce the implementation
complexity of [1, 7], Li et al. [8] proposed an AQS scheme using Bell states and
claimed that their improvements can preserve the merits in the original scheme
[1, 7].
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In an AQS scheme, the arbitrator plays a crucial role. When a dispute
arises between users, the arbitrator should be able to arbitrate the dispute. In
other words, the arbitrator should be able to solve a dispute when a verifier,
Bob, repudiates the receipt of a signature or, in particular, when the verifier
repudiates the integrity of a signature, i.e., Bob admits receiving a signature
but denies the correctness of the signature. The latter dispute implies one of
the following three cases [15]:
(1) Bob told a lie;
(2) The signatory Alice sent incorrect information to Bob;
(3) An eavesdropper Eve disturbed the communications.
As the arbitrator in [1, 7, 8] cannot solve the dispute when Bob claims that
the verification of a signature is not successful, Zou et al. [15] considered that
these schemes are not valid AQS schemes because the security requirement of a
quantum signature, i.e., undeniability, is not satisfied.
By using a public board, Zou et al. also proposed two AQS schemes to solve
the problem. However, this study demonstrates that the same security problem
may exist in Zou et al.’s schemes. In their schemes, when Bob announces that
the verification of a signature is not successful, the arbitrator may not be able to
arbitrate the dispute mentioned above. Moreover, a malicious verifier, Bob, can
actively negate a signature if he wants to. This attack, a special case of denial-of-
service (DoS) attack mentioned in [16], is important in quantum cryptography.
Bob may get some benefits with this DoS attack, since he can actively deny
Alice’s signature without being detected. In addition, this study attempts to
demonstrate that a malicious signer, Alice, can reveal Bob’s secret key without
being detected by using Trojan-horse attacks [17, 18].
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews one of Zou
et al.’s schemes. Section 3 discusses the problems with the scheme. Finally,
Section 4 summarizes the result.
2 Review of Zou et al.’s first signature scheme
Zou et al.’s first AQS scheme [15] is briefly explained in the following scenario.
Alice, the message signatory, wants to sign a quantum message |P 〉 to a signature
verifier, Bob, via the assistance of an arbitrator, Trent. Suppose that Alice and
Bob share a secret key K ∈ {0, 1}
∗
and that the quantum message to be signed
is |P 〉 = |P1〉 ⊗ |P2〉 ⊗ ... ⊗ |Pn〉, where |K| ≥ 2n, |Pi〉 = αi |0〉 + βi |1〉, and
1 ≤ i ≤ n. In order to protect the quantum message, the quantum one-time-
pad encryption EK [19] and the unitary transformationMK used in the schemes
are defined as follows.
EK (|P 〉) =
n⊗
i=1
σK2i−1x σ
K2i
z |Pi〉 , (1)
MK (|P 〉) =
n⊗
i=1
σKix σ
Ki⊕1
z |Pi〉 , (2)
where |Pi〉 and Ki denote the ith bit of |P 〉 and K, respectively, and σx and σz
are the respective Pauli matrices.
To prevent the integrity of a signature from being repudiated by Bob, Zou
et al. proposed two AQS schemes: the AQS scheme using Bell states and the
AQS without using entangled states. In this paper, we only review their AQS
scheme using Bell states.
Suppose that Alice wants to sign an n-qubit quantum message |P 〉 to Bob.
In order to perform the signature, three copies of |P 〉 are necessary. The scheme
proceeds as follows:
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Initialization phase:
Step I1. The arbitrator Trent shares the secret keys KA and KB with Alice
and Bob, respectively, through some unconditionally secure quantum key
distribution protocols.
Step I2. Alice generates n Bell states, |ψi〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB), where
1 ≤ i ≤ n; the subscripts A and B denote the first and second particles of
the Bell state, respectively. After that, Alice sends all B particles to Bob
in a secure and authenticated way [20, 21].
Signing phase:
Step S1. Alice chooses a random number r ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}n to encrypt all
|P 〉’s, i.e., |P ′〉 = Er (|P 〉).
Step S2. Alice generates |SA〉 = EKA (|P
′〉).
Step S3. Alice combines each |P ′i 〉 with the first particle A of each Bell state.
Then, each original Bell state becomes a three-particle entangled state,
|φi〉PAB =
∣∣P ′i
〉
⊗|ψi〉AB =
1
2


∣∣∣Φ+
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|0〉 + β
′
i
|1〉
)
B
+
∣∣∣Φ−
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|0〉 − β
′
i
|1〉
)
B
+
∣∣∣Ψ+
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|1〉 + β
′
i
|0〉
)
B
+
∣∣∣Ψ−
PA
〉
i
(
α
′
i
|1〉 − β
′
i
|0〉
)
B

 ,
where
∣∣Φ+PA
〉
,
∣∣Φ−PA
〉
,
∣∣Ψ+PA
〉
, and
∣∣Ψ−PA
〉
are the four Bell states [22].
Step S4. Alice performs a Bell measurement on each pair |φi〉PA and ob-
tains the measurement results |MA〉 =
(∣∣M1A
〉
,
∣∣M2A
〉
, . . . , |MnA〉
)
, where
∣∣M iA
〉
∈
{∣∣Φ+PA
〉
i
,
∣∣Φ−PA
〉
i
,
∣∣Ψ+PA
〉
i
,
∣∣Ψ−PA
〉
i
}
, and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Step S5. Alice sends |S〉 = (|P ′〉 , |SA〉 , |MA〉) to Bob.
Verification phase:
Step V 1. Bob encrypts |P ′〉 and |SA〉 with KB and sends the quantum cipher-
text |YB〉 = EKB (|P
′〉 , |SA〉) to Trent.
5
Step V 2. Trent decrypts |YB〉 with KB and obtains |P
′〉 and |SA〉. Next, he
encrypts |P ′〉 with KA and obtains |ST 〉. If |ST 〉 = |SA〉 [8, 23], then Trent
sets the verification parameter V = 1; otherwise, he sets V = 0.
Step V 3. Trent recovers |P ′〉 from |ST 〉. Then, he encrypts |P ′〉 , |SA〉, and V
with KB and sends the quantum ciphertext |YT 〉 = EKB (|P
′〉 , |SA〉 , V )
to Bob.
Step V 4. Bob decrypts |YT 〉 and obtains |P
′〉 , |SA〉, and V . If V = 0, Bob
rejects the signature; otherwise, Bob continues to the next step.
Step V 5. Based on Alice’s measurement resultsMA, Bob can obtain |P
′
B〉 from
the B particles received from the Step I2, according to the principle of
teleportation [8]. Next, he compares |P ′B〉 with |P
′〉. If |P ′B〉 = |P
′〉, Bob
informs Alice to publish r and proceeds to the next step; otherwise, he
rejects the signature.
Step V 6. Alice publishes r on the public board.
Step V 7. Bob recovers |P 〉 from |P ′〉 by r and holds (|SA〉 , r) as Alice’s signa-
ture for the quantum message |P 〉.
3 Discussion on Zou et al.’s scheme
This section discusses problems that could arise in Zou et al.’s scheme if pre-
cautions are not taken. We first present a DoS attack by using undeniability
dilemma and give an example to show that a verifier can actively negate a
signature without being detected to get some benefits in his favor. Then, we
introduce Trojan-horse attacks to Zou et al.’s scheme.
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3.1 Undeniability dilemma - A Denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tack
In Zou et al.’s scheme, the signatory Alice uses a random number r to protect
the quantum message |P 〉 (i.e., |P ′〉 = Er (|P 〉)) before signing it. After the
verification by the arbitrator Trent, Bob recovers |P ′B〉 and compares it with |P
′〉.
Once Bob informs Alice that |P ′B〉 = |P
′〉, Alice publishes r on the public board,
which is assumed to be free from being blocked, injected, or altered. Finally,
Bob recovers |P 〉 from |P ′〉 by r and retains (|SA〉 , r) as Alice’s signature.
It appears that if Bob informs Alice to publish r on the public board, then
he cannot disavow the integrity of the signature. In accordance with this logic,
Zou et al. considered that the use of the public board can prevent the denial
attack from Bob. However, if Bob claims that |P ′B〉 6= |P
′〉 in Step V 5 before
requesting the value of r from Alice, then Trent cannot arbitrate the dispute
between Alice and Bob because one of the following three possible cases may
occur.
1. Bob told a lie: In this case, Bob decides to forego the recovery of the
message |P 〉 due to some reasons;
2. Alice sent incorrect information to Bob: In Step S3, Alice deliberately
generated |φi〉 using another message
∣∣∣Pˆ ′i
〉
with
∣∣∣Pˆ ′i
〉
6= |P ′i 〉 or generated
|S〉 = (|P ′〉 , |SA〉 , |M ′A〉) with |M
′
A〉 6= |MA〉 in Step S5;
3. Eve disturbed the communication.
Apparently, when Bob claims that |P ′B〉 6= |P
′〉 in this case, Trent cannot solve
the dispute. Hence, Bob can perform the DoS attack by negating the signature
from Alice without being detected. Furthermore, as also pointed out in [15],
Alice is able to publish an arbitrary value r′ (6= r) such that the oringinal signa-
ture cannot be verified successfully by Bob, which is also contradictory to the
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undeniable requirement of a signature scheme.
This problem could be serious if the signature occurs in an electronic order
system, where Alice is a buyer and Bob, a company. Bob is able to negate a
signed order from Alice if the current market situation is not in his favor. In
such a case, it does not matter whether Bob can obtain the value r to recover
the signed order from Alice, because Bob knows that due to the order, he will
lose a fortune. Similarly, by controlling the value of r, Alice is also able to select
a situation favorable to her for completing the signature process.
The same dilemma may occur in Zou et al.’s second AQS scheme.
3.2 Trojan-horse attacks
In Zou et al.’s scheme, there are two transmissions of the same quantum signals,
first from Alice to Bob and then from Bob to Trent. Therefore, the malicious
Alice can reveal Bob’s secret key without being detected by using Trojan-horse
attacks [17, 18]. As pointed out in [5], there are two ways to use Trojan-horse at-
tacks: invisible photon eavesdropping (IPE)[17] and delay photon eavesdropping
[18]. Here, we discuss the IPE attack on Zou et al.’s scheme and demonstrate
that Alice can obtain Bob’s secret key without being detected. It should be
noted that Alice can also use the delay photon eavesdropping to reveal Bob’s
secret key in the same way.
In order to reveal Bob’s secret key KB, Alice can use the IPE attack on the
communications in Step S5 and Step V 1 as follows:
Step S5a. Alice first prepares a set of eavesdropping states, Di ∈
{
1√
2
(|00〉+
|11〉)di
1
di
2
}
, as invisible photons, where the subscripts di1 and d
i
2 represent
the first and second photons, respectively, in Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each
state in |P ′〉 (or |SA〉), Alice inserts di1 as an invisible photon to that state
and forms a new sequence |P ′〉d1 (|SA〉
d1). Next, Alice sends |S〉
d1 =
8
(
|P ′〉d1 , |SA〉 , |MA〉
)
to Bob.
Step V 1a. Bob encrypts |P ′〉d1 and |SA〉 with KB and sends the quantum ci-
phertext |YB〉
d
1′ = EKB (|P
′〉d1 , |SA〉) to Trent. Before Trent receives the
quantum ciphertext |YB〉
d
1′ , Alice captures d1′ from |YB〉
d
1′ and measures
d1′d2 together with the Bell measurement. According to the measurement
result of di
1′
di2, Alice can obtain Bob’s secret key K
2i−1,2i
B .
It should be noted that Alice can similarly use the process mentioned above to
obtain Bob’s secret key KBT in Zou et al.’s second AQS scheme. Since both
schemes are susceptible to Trojan-horse attacks, Bob can deny having verified
a signature.
To prevent the scheme from Trojan-horse attacks, it is well-know that two
additional devices, a wavelength filter and a photon number splitter (PNS) can
be added to the protocol. By letting the received photons pass through both
devices, the photons with different wavelength or the delay photons will not
exist or will be detected [24, 18].
4 Conclusions
This paper has pointed out security flaws in Zou et al.’s AQS schemes, in which
Trent cannot arbitrate a dispute between Alice and Bob when Bob claims a
failure in the signature verification phase. Besides, a malicious verifier, Bob, can
actively negate a signed order from Alice without being detected to get some
benefits in his favor. In addition, we demonstrate that a malicious signatory
can reveal the verifier’s secret key by launching Trojan-horse attacks on Zou et
al.’s AQS scheme. How to design an AQS scheme without the DoS attack and
how to construct an AQS scheme free from Trojan-horse attacks without using
any hardware device will be an interesting future research.
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